Disrupting AWS S3 Logging
This post continues the series of highlights from our recent BlackHat USA 2017 talk. An index of all the posts in the series is here . Introduction Before today's public clouds, best practice was to store logs separately from the host that generated them. If the host was compromised, the logs stored off it would have a better chance of being preserved. At a cloud provider like AWS, a storage service within an account holds your activity logs. A sufficiently thorough compromise of an account could very well lead to disrupted logging and heightened pain for IR teams. It's analogous to logs stored on a single compromised machine: once access restrictions to the logs are overcome, logs can be tampered with and removed. In AWS, however, removing and editing logs looks different to wiping logs with rm -rf . In AWS jargon, the logs originate from a service called CloudTrail. A Trail is created which delivers the current batch of activity logs in a file to a pre-defined S3 bucket at v...